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Abstract: Mix-net is a system that can provide anonymity in a computer network.
Mix-net takes as an input user's ciphertexts and outputs them in a shued order. Secure
e-voting and variety of other applications can be built on top of mix-net architecture.
Major challenge of constructing mix-nets lies in efficiently proving that shuing was
done correctly. Mix-net cannot reveal the permutation because that would break the
anonymity. One solution is to provide a zero-knowledge proof.
This thesis studies a zero-knowledge shue argument proposed by J. Furukawa in 2005.
Firstly we provide a more detailed and easily readable description of the shue and
shue-decryption zero-knowledge protocols than in the original paper. Secondly we pro-
vide two new characterizations of a permutation matrix and two simple modifications of
the shue protocol that reduce the computational complexity.
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CERCS: P170
Turvalised ja efektiivsed mix-net 'id
Lühikokkuvõte:
Mix-net on süsteem, mis võimaldab saavutada anonüümsuse arvutite vahelises suhtluses.
Mix-net võtab sisendiks kasutajate krüptogrammid ja väljastab krüptogrammid juhusli-
kult segatud järjekorras. Mix-net 'id võimaldavad turvalise e-valimise ning paljude teiste
anonüümsust vajavate rakenduste konstrueerimist.
Mix-net 'ide ehitamisel on oluline võimalus veenduda, et segamine toimus korrektselt.
Samas ei saa mix-net avaldada, kuidas segamine toimus, kuna sellega kaoks anonüümsus.
Võimalik lahendus sellele probleemile on nullteadmusprotokolli kasutamine.
Antud magistritöös uuritakse J. Furukawa 2005. aastal välja pakutud nullteadmusproto-
kolli krüptogrammide segamise jaoks. Esiteks antakse detailne ja kergemini loetav kir-
jeldus Furukawa segamise ja segamis-dekrüpteerimise nullteadmusprotokollidest. Lisaks
pakutakse välja kaks uut permutatsioonimaatriksi kirjeldust ning kaks lihtsat muudatust
segamise protokollile, mis aitavad vähendada ajalist keerukust.
Võtmesõnad: mix-net, mix-server, nullteadmus, segamine
CERCS: P170
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1 Introduction
A mix network (mix-net), first introduced in [Cha81], is a system that can provide
anonymity in communication. A mix network contains several mix servers called mixers.
Users send ciphertexts to the mix network and mixers take turns in shuing the cipher-
texts. Final mixer sends ciphertexts to their correct recipients. Shuing can be done by
permuting and rerandomizing the ciphertexts. Output ciphertexts will not be traceable
to the original source if at least one mixer keeps the shue secret.
There is a wide range of applications that can use mix-nets. They are more suitable in
situations where there is a large batch of ciphertexts that needs to be anonymized. Some
of the examples are e-voting, anonymous e-mail and online surveys. Closely related is the
concept of onion routing. In there, the anonymity comes from difficulty of observing a
large network. Onion routing is more suitable in applications were few ciphertexts need
to be anonymized at a given moment.
It is important that mixers shue correctly. It would be disastrous if, for example,
in a voting application a mixer could copy, modify or insert new votes. A mixer cannot
reveal the permutation or randomizers to prove correctness of the shue because it would
de-anonymize the ciphertexts.
Correctness of a shue can be verified using a zero-knowledge proof. In a zero-knowledge
proof, there are two parties: the prover and the verifier. The prover must convince the
verifier that a certain statement holds. In the case of shuing, the prover must convince
the verifier that the output ciphertexts are a shue of the input ciphertexts and that it
knows the corresponding permutation and randomizers.
In some applications, it might be useful if mixers also decrypt the ciphertexts. Then the
private key of a mix-net would be shared between mixers. Users would encrypt messages
with the mix-net's public key. In a mix-net, each mixer would do partial decryption
together with shuing. The output of the mix-net would be the anonymized plaintexts.
As the number of ciphertexts can be large, the efficiency is a mayor concern in a shue
and shue-decryption protocols. Several different approaches like [Wik09] and [BG12]
have been proposed for a zero-knowledge shue argument. In this thesis, we study shue
and shue-decryption arguments proposed in [Fur05] by J. Furukawa.
Shue argument proposed by Furukawa is based on a characterization of a permutation
matrix that is efficient to prove. Original argument, which is also presented in this thesis,
is for ElGamal ciphertexts. Later, it has been generalized in [NSNK05] and [GL07] to a
larger class of cryptosystems.
This thesis has two goals. Firstly we provide a more detailed and easily understandable
description of the Furukawa shue and shue-decryption arguments compared to the
original paper. Also, we describe the tools like Pedersen commitment and Schwartz-
Zippel lemma that are needed in the protocol but were not described [Fur05].
Secondly we try to improve the Furukawa shue argument. We show two simple mod-
ifications that reduce the computation. We also propose two new characterizations of a
permutation matrix. Further research is needed to see if these can be used to construct
even more efficient shue arguments.
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In section 2, we introduce notation and definitions used throughout the thesis. In section
3, we give a detailed description of the Furukawa shue argument and also propose some
improvements and a new characterizations of a permutation matrix. In section 4, we
show the construction of the Furukawa shue-decryption argument, which is based on
the shue argument.
The author was supported by the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation
programme under grant agreement No 653497 (project PANORAMIX).
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2 Preliminaries
Let Z denote the set of integers and N = {1, 2, . . . } is the set of natural numbers. Let
Zn be the set of integers modulo n. By Z∗n we denote the set of all invertible elements of
Zn. If p is a prime then Zp is a field and Z∗p = Zp \ {0} forms a multiplicative group.
By x←r A we denote picking uniformly random element x from set A. Let a, b ∈ Z and
a ≤ b then [a..b] := {c ∈ Z : a ≤ c ≤ b}. We denote (vi)li=k := (vk, vk+1, . . . , vl) where
l ≤ l.
Definition 1. Let F be a field. Hadamard product is an operation ◦ : Fn×m × Fn×m →
Fn×m such that for any A = (ai,j), B = (bi,j) ∈ Fn×m where n,m ∈ N we have A ◦ B =
(ai,j · bi,j).
We make use of the following lemma.
Lemma (Schwartz-Zippel). Let p ∈ Zq[X1, X2, . . . , Xn] be a non-zero polynomial of
degree d. Probability that p(c1, c2, . . . , cn) = 0 for c1, c2, . . . , cn ←r Zq is at most dq−1 .
In the proof of the protocol we use contrapositive of this lemma. We show that some
unknown low-degree polynomial evaluates to 0 at a random point and conclude that with
high probability it must be a zero polynomial i.e. the coefficients of the polynomial are
0.
Definition 2. Function ε : N → R is said to be negligible if for any c > 0 there exists
N ∈ N such that
∀n ≥ N : ε(n) < 1
nc
.
If outcome of an experiment happens with a negligible probability then the expected
number of repetitions to make the event happen is superpolynomial. It is thus inefficient
to make a negligible events happen.
Definition 3. Function f : N → R is said to be overwhelming if 1 − f is a negligible
function.
2.1 ElGamal and Assumptions
Definition 4. [ElG84] ElGamal encryption scheme contains the following four algo-
rithms:
Setup. Returns a suitable cyclic group G of order q and some generator g of that
group.
Key generation. Picks a secret key s←r Zq. Public key is h = gs.
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Encryption. Let m ∈ G be the message. Random value r ←r Zq is chosen. Encryp-
tion function E is defined as
E(m, r) := (gr,m · hr) = (c1, c2).
Decryption. Let (c1, c2) be a ciphertext. Decryption function D is defined as
D(c1, c2) :=
c2
cs1
=
m · hr
(gr)s
=
m · hr
hr
= m.
Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q with generator g.
Definition 5 (DDH Assumption). Let x, y ←r Zq and β ←r {0, 1}. If β = 0 then
z = xy and otherwise z ←r Zq. We say that decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption
holds in group G if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A the probability
Pr[A(g, gx, gy, gz) = β]
is negligible in log(q).
It can be shown that ElGamal encryption scheme is semantically secure if DDH assump-
tion holds in group G.
Definition 6 (DL Assumption). We say that discrete logarithm (DL) assumption
holds in group G if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A the probability
Pr[A(g, gx) = x : x←r Zq]
is negligible in log(q).
It can be shown that if DDH assumption holds in group G then DL assumption holds in
group G.
In the proof of the shue-decryption privacy we will make use of the extended DDH
assumption.
Definition 7. Let Rmn := G
(n+1)m. We denote elements of Rmn as Θm,n := (θi,v)i∈[1..m]
v∈[0..n]
.
Let
Dmn := {Θm,n ∈ Rmn | ∀v ∈ [1..n] ∀j ∈ [2..m] : logθ1,0 θj,0 = logθ1,v θj,v}
and β ←r {0, 1}. If β = 0 then Θm,n ←r Dmn , otherwise Θm,n ←r Rmn . We say that
DDHmn assumption holds in group G if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
A the probability
Pr[A(Θm,n) = β]
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is negligible in log(q).
In DDH21 assumption we have Θ
2
1 = (θ1,0, θ1,1, θ2,0, θ2,1) such that if Θ
2
1 ∈ D21 then
logθ1,0 θ2,0 = logθ1,1 θ2,1 =
logθ1,0 θ2,1
logθ1,0 θ1,1
.
Thus
logθ1,0 θ2,0 logθ1,0 θ1,1 = logθ1,0 θ2,1
and it can be seen that the DDH21 is the DDH assumption.
In [FS01] it is shown that if DDHmn can be broken then DDH can be broken.
2.2 Permutation matrices
We denote by δi,j and δi,j,k the functions
δi,j =
{
1 if i = j
0 otherwise
and
δi,j,k =
{
1 if i = j = k
0 otherwise
.
Definition 8. Let q be a prime. A matrix A = (Ai,j) ∈ Zn×nq is called a permutation
matrix if for any i, j ∈ [1..n] we have
Ai,j = δpi(i),j
where pi : [1..n]→ [1..n] is a permutation.
We prove two theorems (theorem 1 and 2) from [Fur05] that give alternative definitions
for a permutation matrix. Furukawa uses these definitions in the shue and the shue-
decryption protocols.
Lemma 1. Let q be a prime. If matrix A ∈ Zn×nq is such that for any i, j, k ∈ [1..n]
n∑
h=1
Ah,iAh,jAh,k = δi,j,k
then any row and column of the matrix A has exactly one nonzero element.
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Proof. We show first that matrix A is full rank.
Let us denote by Ai and Ai correspondingly the i-th column and row vector of A where
i ∈ [1..n].
To show that A is full rank we may show that vectors A1, . . . , An are linearly independent.
Let α1, . . . , αn ∈ Zq be such that
n∑
j=1
αjA
j = 0¯
where 0¯ is a zero vector of length n.
Let us compute the following scalar product for i ∈ [1..n]
〈
n∑
j=1
αjA
j, Ai ◦ Ai〉 =
n∑
j=1
〈αjAj, Ai ◦ Ai〉 =
n∑
j=1
αj〈Aj, Ai ◦ Ai〉
Let us look separately the part
〈Aj, Ai ◦ Ai〉 =
n∑
h=1
Ah,jAh,iAh,i = δj,i,i = δj,i.
Therefore
〈
n∑
j=1
αjA
j, Ai ◦ Ai〉 = αi.
We know in addition that 〈∑nj=1 αjAj, Ai◦Ai〉 = 0 because∑nj=1 αjAj = 0. Thus αi = 0.
This argument works for any i ∈ [1..n] which means that column vectors of A are linearly
independent.
Let us show that for any i, j ∈ [1..n], if i 6= j then Ai ◦ Aj = 0¯.
We compute
(A1,iA1,j)A1 + . . .+ (An,iAn,j)An = (
n∑
h=1
Ah,iAh,jAh,1, . . . ,
n∑
h=1
Ah,iAh,jAh,n) =
= (δi,j,1, . . . , δi,j,n) = 0¯.
Because the row vectors of A are linearly independent, the coefficients must be zeros and
thus Ai ◦ Aj = 0¯.
Because A is fullrank there are no zero columns or rows. Let As,i be some nonzero element
in s-th row . Then it must be the only nonzero element in s-th row because otherwise
there would exist some other j-th column such that Ai ◦ Aj 6= 0¯.
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Because all the rows have exactly one nonzero element and there are no zero columns
then every column has also exactly one nonzero element as well.
Theorem 1. Let q be a prime. Matrix A ∈ Zn×nq is a permutation matrix if and only if
for any i, j, k ∈ [1..n]
n∑
h=1
Ah,iAh,jAh,k = δi,j,k (1)
and
n∑
h=1
Ah,iAh,j = δi,j. (2)
Proof. ⇒) Let A ∈ Zn×nq be a permutation matrix for an arbitrary permutation pi :
[1..n]→ [1..n]. Let i, j, k be arbitrary column indices from the set [1..n]. Then
n∑
h=1
Ah,iAh,jAh,k =
n∑
h=1
δpi(h),iδpi(h),jδpi(h),k
Expression δpi(h),iδpi(h),jδpi(h),k = 1 only if pi(h) = i = j = k. Because pi is a permutation
we have that pi(h) = i for exactly one value of h, thus we may write
n∑
h=1
Ah,iAh,jAh,k = δi,iδi,jδi,k = 1 · δi,jδi,k = δi,j,k.
Proof for the second property is analogues
n∑
h=1
Ah,iAh,j =
n∑
h=1
δpi(h),iδpi(h),j = δi,iδi,j = δi,j.
⇐) According to lemma 1 every row and column of matrix A contains exactly one nonzero
element. Let us pick an arbitrary column index i ∈ [1..n]. From property (1) and (2) we
get
n∑
h=1
A3h,i = 1
and
n∑
h=1
A2h,i = 1.
Because there is only one nonzero element then there must exist row index s such that
A3s,i = 1 and A
2
s,i = 1. Then
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As,i =
A3s,i
A2s,i
= 1.
Therefore A is a permutation matrix.
Theorem 2. Let q be a prime such that q mod 3 = 2. Matrix A ∈ Zn×nq is a permutation
matrix if and only if for any i, j, k ∈ [1..n]
n∑
h=1
Ah,iAh,jAh,k = δi,j,k.
Proof. ⇒) Holds due to the theorem 1.
⇐) According to the lemma 1 every row and column of the matrix A has exactly one
nonzero element. For any column index i there exists a row index s such that A3s,i = 1
where As,i ∈ Zq.
Because q mod 3 = 2 we have that q = 3k + 2 for some integer k. Then
Aqs,i = A
3k+2
s,i = (A
3
s,i)
kA2s,i = A
2
s,i.
From Fermat's little theorem we also have that
Aqs,i = As,i.
These facts together imply that
As,i =
A2s,i
As,i
=
Aqs,i
Aqs,i
= 1.
Therefore A is a permutation matrix.
2.3 Commitment schemes
Commitment scheme allows to commit to some value while keeping the value secret.
Committer has the ability to reveal (open) the commitment at a later time. Commitment
scheme should be hiding i.e. commitment should not reveal information about the
committed value. Commitment scheme should be binding i.e. commitment can be
opened only to the value that was committed.
Protocol described later makes use of the extended Pedersen vector commitment scheme.
[Ped91]
Definition 9. Extended Pedersen commitment scheme for n elements consists of three
algorithms:
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Setup. Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q. Algorithm picks generators
g, f1, f2, . . . , fn ←r G \ {1} and returns ck ← (G, g, f1, . . . , fn).
Commitment. Let a¯ = (ai)
n
i=1 ∈ Znq and r ←r Zq. Commitment to the vector a¯ is
comck(a¯, r) := g
r
n∏
i=1
faii = C.
In the commitment phase C is published and in the revealing phase the opening (a¯, r)
is published.
Verification. Let C be the commitment and (a¯, r) the corresponding opening. Com-
mitment is correct if comck(a¯, r) = C.
The extended Pedersen commitment is perfectly hiding because gr
∏n
i=1 f
ai
i is a uniformly
random element in G. It can be shown that the extended Pedersen commitment is
computationally binding if the discrete logarithm assumption holds in group G.
2.4 Zero-knowledge Protocols
This section introduces basic notions related to zero-knowledge protocols (also called
zero-knowledge proofs).
To model interactive communication we use interactive Turing machines. In the following
(P, V ) is a pair of probabilistic polynomial-time interactive Turing machines. Interactive
pair of Turing machines is defined almost like a regular Turing machines but in addition
Turing machines P and V share two input/output tapes. To one tape P can write and
V can only read, to the other tape V can write and P can only read. Turing machines
take turns in computing. Prover P starts the computation and verfier V ends it. Output
of the pair (P, V ) is the sequence of values communicated between P and V . A more
detailed description can be seen in [GMR85].
We look at the situation where a prover P wants to convince a verifier V that a certain
statement is true (x ∈ L) using some auxiliary information ω. Depending if the verifier
is convinced or not it outputs "accept" or "reject" accordingly.
We assume in the following that R is an MA relation i.e. there exists a probabilistic
polynomial-time Turing machine A and a polynomial p such that
∀x ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∀ω ∈ {0, 1}p(|x|) : (x, ω) ∈ R⇔ Pr[A(x, ω) = 1] ≥ 1− 2−|x|
∀x ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∀ω ∈ {0, 1}p(|x|) : (x, ω) 6∈ R⇔ Pr[A(x, ω) = 1] ≤ 2−|x|.
Corresponding language is denoted by LR := {x : (∃ω ∈ {0, 1}∗)[(x, ω) ∈ R]}. Notably
MA relations exist for all NP languages.
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Definition 10. The pair (P, V ) is called an interactive argument for language LR if it
satisfies the following conditions:
Completeness: If (x, ω) ∈ R then given ω as a private input to P makes (P (x, ω), V (x))
output "accept".
Soundness: If x 6∈ L then for any probabilistic polynomial-time prover P ∗ proba-
bility that the pair (P ∗, V ) outputs "accept" is negligible in the length of x.
In the case of shuing it is not sufficient to prove that ciphertexts were shued. For
example a malicious mixer could undo the suing of the previous mixers by outputting
the ciphertexts that were inputs to the first mixer. There exists some permutation and
randomizers which would make it a legitimate shue. Therefore it is necessary that mixer
also proves that it knows the permutation and the randomizer. A proof of knowledge is
formalized in the following definition [BG93].
Definition 11. Let κ : {0, 1}∗ → [0, 1]. Interactive argument (P, V ) is called a proof of
knowledge for relation R with knowledge error κ if the following condition holds:
Knowledge soundness: Let εP ∗(x) be the probability that prover P
∗ makes V ac-
cept. There exist a probabilistic Turing machine K called a knowledge extractor that
gets a rewindable black-box oracle access to P ∗. Extractor K satisfies the following
condition: there exists c > 0 such that for any prover P ∗ and the corresponding
probability function εP ∗(x) if εP ∗(x) > κ(x) then K outputs ω such that (x, ω) ∈ R
in expected time at most
|x|c
ε(x)− κ(x) .
We can view a probabilistic Turing machine as a random variable. A machineM on some
input x defines a distribution on the possible outputs.
Definition 12. Probabilistic Turing machines M1 and M2 are said to be perfectly in-
distinguishable if for any input x ∈ {0, 1}∗ we have M1(x) = M2(x). This is denoted as
M1 ∼p M2.
The following definition guarantees that the only information that the verifier learns is
that x ∈ L.
Definition 13. An interactive pair (P, V ) for language LR is said to be zero-knowledge
(ZK) if for any probabilistic polynomial-time verifier V ∗, there exists a simulator S run-
ning in expected polynomial-time such that
(∀x ∈ L) (∀σ ∈ {0, 1}∗) [S(x, σ) ∼p (P (x), V ∗(x, σ))].
Bitstring σ in the definition denotes some prior knowledges that verifier V ∗ might have.
Definition implies that verifier V ∗ could produce the conversation by itself using the
simulator S. Thus the conversation with prover P cannot leak any information.
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Definition 14. A 3-message protocol (P, V ) is said to be special honest-verifier zero-
knowledge (SHVZK) if there exist a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator S such that
for any x ∈ LR:
1. For any challenge c simulator S(c) outputs an accepting conversation (a, c, z).
2. For uniformly randomly chosen challenge c we have S(c) ∼p (P, V ).
It is often easier to prove that a protocol is SHVZK rather than ZK. SHVZK assumes
however that the challenge from the verifier is chosen uniformly randomly. This might
not be true in the case of a malicious verifier.
There are standard constructions that allow to make 3-message SHVZK protocols into
ZK protocols with one more round and additive overhead. [GMY06]
In practice it might be useful to turn a SHVZK protocol into a non-interactive ZK protocol
instead. This can be done using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. There the prover computes a
challenge himself by using a hash function. It can be shown that Fiat-Shamir heuristic
is secure in the random oracle model. [FS86]
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3 Furukawa Shue Argument
This section contains a proof of knowledge argument for the ElGamal ciphertext shuing
proposed in [Fur05]. More specifically it is a 3-message proof of knowledge argument that
is perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge.
Let n be the number of ciphertexts. In this protocol prover and verifier must respectively
do approximately 8n and 6n exponentiations. Communication is roughly n log p+3n log q
bits where p and q are two large primes and q  p.
3.1 Description
3.1.1 Setup
Let p and q be two large primes such that q|(p− 1). Let G be an order q multiplicative
subgroup of Z∗p with generator g0. According to the Cauchy's theorem such a subgroup
always exists. Let m0 ∈ G be an ElGamal public key that was used for encrypting input
ciphertexts zi = (gi,mi) for i ∈ [1..n]. The mix server picks a random permutation
pi : [1..n] → [1..n] and n randomizers (A0,i)ni=1 ∈ Znq . The mix server computes output
ciphertexts
z′i = E(1, A0,i) ◦ zpi−1(i) = (gA0,i0 gpi−1(i),mA0,i0 mpi−1(i))
for i ∈ [1..n]. We denote z′i := (g′i,m′i).
Let F := (fi)
n
i=−4 ←r (G \ {1})n be generators for the extended Pedersen commitment.
Matrix A ∈ Zn×nq is a permutation matrix corresponding to the permutation pi. Then the
following equation holds
z′i = (g
′
i,m
′
i) = (g
A0,i
0
n∏
j=1
g
δpi(j),i
j ,m
A0,i
0
n∏
j=1
m
δpi(j),i
j ) = (
n∏
j=0
g
Aji
j ,
n∏
j=0
m
Aji
j ) (3)
for i ∈ [1..n].
The mix server acting as a prover P must prove to a verifier V that it knows the permu-
tation pi and the randomizers A0,i for i ∈ [1..n] without any leaking in other knowledge.
Both the prover P and the verifier V get as an input pk ← (p, q, g0,m0, F, (zi)ni=1, (z′i)ni=1).
The prover P knows in addition A and (A0,i)
n
i=1.
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3.1.2 Protocol
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3.1.3 Overview
In this subsection we explain the general idea of the protocol.
Commitment
The protocol starts with the prover committing to a series of values.
Most important part of the commitment is the equation (7). This is an Extended Peder-
sen commitment of the columns of the permutation matrix, randomizers and also some
additional values (A−2i)ni=1, (A−3i)
n
i=1, (A−4i)
n
i=1. The elements (A−1i)
n
i=1 are used to hide
the commitment. Values g′0, m
′
0, f˜
′
0 and f0 are needed to get zero-knowledge. Values ω
and ω˙ are used to cancel out unnecessary terms in the equation (12) and (13).
Challenge
The verifier sends n uniformly random and independent elements of Zq to prover. This
allows us to later use Schwartz-Zippel lemma.
Response
The prover responds with rv = Av0+
∑n
µ=1 Avµcµ and r
′
v = A
′
v+
∑n
i=1Avic
2
i for v ∈ [−4..n].
These can be thought of as polynomials evaluated at random point (ci)
n
i=1. Values Av0
and A′v are used to hide the response.
Having a responses in the form of a linear equations gives an easy way to extract the
permutation matrix A and randomizers (A0i)
n
i=1. For a fixed commitment, extractor
can use rewinding and attains for each v ∈ [−4..n] linear equations where (Avµ)nµ=0 are
the unknowns. Having n + 1 equations with linearly independent coefficients allows an
extractor to solve the system and obtain (Avµ)
n
µ=0.
Verification
Equation (9) can be used to prove that prover computed responses (rv)
n
v=−4 and (r
′
v)
n
v=−4
correctly.
Equations (12) and (13) can be used to show that respectively properties (1) and (2) hold
for matrix A i.e. A is a permutation matrix. If we view
∑n
h=1 r
3
h − c3h and
∑n
h=1 r
2
h − c2h
as polynomials evaluated at a random point (ci)
n
i=1, it turns out that coefficients of those
polynomials are such that using the Schwartz-Zippel lemma allows us to prove property
(1) and (2). The constant term and some of the coefficients in those polynomials however
cannot be 0 because they depend on randomly chosen values (Av0)
n
v=−4. Constant term
can be cancelled with ω and ω˙ in the respective equation. Nonzero coefficients are removed
with r−2, r′−3 and r−4. That is why the prover must commit to A−2i, A−3i and A−4i.
Equations (10) and (11) show that the equation (3) holds i.e. ciphertexts were shued
with the permutation matrix A and rerandomized with (A0i)
n
i=1.
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3.2 Proof
Theorem 3. The shue protocol is complete.
Proof. Let us see that all the verification equations hold if the prover is honest.
(9) Let α←r Zq, then
n∏
v=−4
f rv+αr
′
v
v =
n∏
v=−4
f rvv · fαr
′
v
v =
n∏
v=−4
fAv0c0v · f
∑n
i=1 Avici
v · fαA
′
v
v · fα
∑n
i=1 Avic
2
i
v =
= f ′0 · f˜
′α
0
n∏
v=−4
f
∑n
i=1 Avi(ci+αc
2
i )
v = f
′
0 · f˜
′α
0
n∏
v=−4
n∏
i=1
f
Avi(ci+αc
2
i )
v = f
′
0 · f˜
′α
0
n∏
i=1
(
n∏
v=−4
fAviv )
ci+αc
2
i =
= f ′0 · f˜
′α
0
n∏
i=1
f ′i
ci+αc
2
i .
(10)
n∏
v=0
grvv =
n∏
v=0
g
∑n
µ=0 Avµcµ
v =
n∏
v=0
n∏
µ=0
gAvµcµv =
n∏
µ=0
(
n∏
v=0
gAvµv )
cµ =
n∏
µ=0
(g
′
µ)
cµ
Last equality holds due to the equation (3).
(11) Analogous to the previous one.
(12) If the prover is honest then
rh =
n∑
µ=0
Ahµcµ = Ah0 +
n∑
µ=1
δpi(h)µcµ = Ah0 + cpi(h)
for v ∈ [1..n].
Then left-hand side of the equation (12) is
n∑
h=1
r3h − c3h =
n∑
h=1
A3h0 + 3A
2
h0cpi(h) + 3Ah0c
2
pi(h) + c
3
pi(h) − c3h =
=
n∑
h=1
A3h0 + 3A
2
h0cpi(h) + 3Ah0c
2
pi(h).
Right-hand side of the equation (12) is
r−2 + r′−3 + ω = A−20 +
n∑
h=1
A−2hch +
n∑
h=1
A−3hc2h + A
′
−3 + ω =
18
= A−20 +
n∑
h=1
(
n∑
j=1
3A2j0Ajh)ch +
n∑
h=1
(
n∑
j=1
3Aj0Ajh)c
2
h + A
′
−3 + ω =
=
n∑
h=1
3A2h0cpi(h) +
n∑
h=1
3Ah0c
2
pi(h) + A−20 + A
′
−3 +
n∑
h=1
A3h0 − A−20 − A′−3 =
=
n∑
h=1
A3h0 + 3A
2
h0cpi(h) + 3Ah0c
2
pi(h)
(13) Left-hand side of the equation (13) is
n∑
h=1
r2h − c2h =
n∑
h=1
A2h0 + 2Ah0cpi(h) + c
2
pi(h) − c2h =
n∑
h=1
A2h0 + 2Ah0cpi(h).
Right-hand side of the equation (13) is
r−4 + ω˙ = A−40 +
n∑
h=1
A−4hch + ω˙ = A−40 +
n∑
h=1
(
n∑
j=1
2Aj0Ajh)ch + ω˙ =
= A−40 +
n∑
h=1
2Aµ0cpi(h) +
n∑
h=1
A2h0 − A−40 =
n∑
h=1
A2h0 + 2Aµ0cpi(h).
All the verification equations hold so the protocol is complete.
In the rest of the proof we show that this protocol has knowledge soundness under the
DL assumption.
Lemma 2. If the equation (9) in the protocol holds then the probability that
n∏
v=−4
f rvv =
n∏
µ=0
(f ′µ)
cµ (4)
and
n∏
v=−4
f r
′
v
v = f˜
′
0
n∏
µ=1
(f ′µ)
c2µ (5)
hold is 1− 1
q
.
Proof. For α←r Zq we have
n∏
v=−4
f rv+αr
′
v
v = f
′
0(f˜0
′
)α
n∏
i=1
(f ′i)
ci+αc
2
i .
19
Let us divide both sides of the equation by
∏n
µ=0(f
′
µ)
cµ and
∏n
v=−4 f
αr′v
v . We get
∏n
v=−4 f
rv
v∏n
µ=0(f
′
µ)
cµ
=
(
f˜0
′∏n
i=1(f
′
i)
c2i∏n
v=−4 f
r′v
v
)α
Let us denote x :=
∏n
v=−4 f
rv
v∏n
µ=0(f
′
µ)
cµ and y :=
(
f˜0
′∏n
i=1(f
′
i)
c2i∏n
v=−4 f
r′v
v
)α
. If y = 1 then x = 1 and equation
x = yα holds for all α ∈ Zq. We may note also that if x = 1 then the equation (14) holds
and if y = 1 then the equation (15) holds. If y 6= 1 then y is a generator of group G and
there is exactly one value of α ∈ Zq such that x = yα. Thus the probability that (14) and
(15) hold is 1
q
. Conversely with probability 1− 1
q
the equations (14) and (15) hold.
Lemma 3. If P ∗ can make V accept the protocol with probability ε(pk) > 0 then there
exists an extractor K that can extract from P ∗ the values (Av,µ)nv=−4 for µ ∈ [0..n] and
(A′v)
n
v=−4 in expected time O(
poly(n)
ε(pk)
). The extracted values satisfy the equations (7) and
(8).
Proof. The extractor K works as follows:
1. Let C = ∅. Set a rewinding point after the commitment of P ∗.
2. Pick c1, c2, . . . , cn ←r Zq and set c¯← (1, c1, c2, . . . , cn).
3. If C ′ ← C ∪ {c¯} is not linearly independent go to step 2.
4. Send c¯ to P ∗ then the P ∗ sends a response. If the response satisfies the verification
equations then sets C ← C ′ and saves the response.
5. If |C| 6= n+ 1 then rewind and go to step 2.
6. We have that C = {c¯(1), . . . , c¯(n+1)}. Let us denote c¯(i) := (1, c(i)1 , . . . , c(i)n ) and
corresponding responses by (r
(i)
v )nv=−4 and (r
′
v
(i)
)nv=−4 for i ∈ [1..n+ 1]. It will solve
for each v ∈ [−4..n] a linear system

r
(1)
v =
∑n
µ=0 Avµc
(1)
µ
r
(2)
v =
∑n
µ=0 Avµc
(2)
µ
...
r
(n+1)
v =
∑n
µ=0Avµc
(n+1)
µ
to extract (Avµ)
n
µ=0. This system has exactly one solution because vectors in C are
linearly independent.
7. The values (A′v)
n
v=−4 can be extracted by computing
A′v = r
′
v
(1) −
n∑
i=1
Avi(c
(1)
i )
2
for v ∈ [−4..n].
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We show that the values (Avµ)
n
v=−4 extracted in the step 6. satisfy the equation (7). Due
to the lemma 2 we have that
n∏
v=−4
f r
(i)
v
v =
n∏
µ=0
(f ′µ)
c
(i)
µ
for i ∈ [1..n+ 1]. Then
n∏
v=−4
f
∑n
µ=0 Avµc
(i)
µ
v =
n∏
µ=0
(f ′µ)
c
(i)
µ
n∏
µ=0
f
∑n
v=−4 Avµc
(i)
µ
v =
n∏
µ=0
(f ′µ)
c
(i)
µ
n∏
µ=0
(
f
∑n
v=−4 Avµ
v
f ′µ
)c(i)µ
= 1.
Let us denote xµ := logg0
(
f
∑n
v=−4 Avµ
v
f ′µ
)
for µ ∈ [0..n]. Then the previous equation can be
written as
n∏
µ=0
g
xµc
(i)
µ
0 = 1
g
∑n
µ=0 xµc
(i)
µ
0 = g
0
0.
We get a homogeneous linear system of equations

∑n
µ=0 xµc
(1)
µ = 0∑n
µ=0 xµc
(2)
µ = 0
...∑n
µ=0 xµc
(n+1)
µ = 0
.
It has exactly one solution x1 = x2 = . . . = xn = 0. Thus
f
∑n
v=−4 Avµ
v
f ′µ
= g0 = 1⇒ f ′µ = f
∑n
v=−4 Avµ
v =
n∏
v=−4
fAvµv
and the equation (7) holds.
We show that the values (Av)
n
v=−4 extracted in the step 7. satisfies the equation (8).
Using the lemma 2 again we have
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n∏
v=−4
f r
′
v
(1)
v = f˜
′
0
n∏
µ=1
(f ′µ)
(c
(1)
µ )
2
.
From this equation we get
f˜ ′0 =
∏n
v=−4 f
r′v
(1)
v∏n
µ=1(f
′
µ)
(c
(1)
µ )2
=
∏n
v=−4 f
∑n
i=1 Avi(c
(1)
i )
2+A′v
v∏n
µ=1
∏n
v=−4 f
Avµ(c
(1)
µ )2
v
=
n∏
v=−4
fA
′
v
v .
Results that the equation (8) holds.
We must show that this extractor works in expected time O(poly(n)
ε(pk)
). The step 1 takes
constant time an in the steps 2-4 we must analyse the number of iterations expected
until we get n + 1 linearly independent vectors for which P ∗ can produce an accepting
response.
Suppose the algorithm has found |C| = l ∈ [1..n] acceptable challenges so far. Let A :=
”C ∪{c¯} is linearly independent” and B := ”c¯ produces acceptable response”. There are
ql vectors in Zn+1q that are linearly dependent with vectors in C. Of those vectors 1q start
with 1. Therefore Pr[A¯] =
ql 1
q
qn
= q
l−1
qn
. It is also known that Pr[B] = ε(pk). Then
Pr[A ∧B] = 1− Pr[A¯ ∨ B¯] = 1− Pr[A¯]− Pr[B¯] + Pr[A¯ ∧ B¯] =
= 1− q
l−1
qn
− (1− ε(pk)) + Pr[A¯∧ B¯] ≥ ε(pk)− q
l−1
qn
≥ ε(pk)− q
n−1
qn
= ε(pk)− 1
q
≈ ε(pk).
If the probability of getting a suitable c¯ in the step 2 is at least ε(pk) then the expected
number of times a new challenge has to be picked is 1
ε(pk)
. To get n + 1 such challenges
takes expected time of n+1
ε(pk)
.
Solving a linear system of equation in the step 6, can be done in time O(n3). The step
7 takes linear amount of time. Altogether K does O( ε(pk)(n
3+n)+n+1
ε(pk)
) expected number of
steps.
In the previous lemma we have used n linearly independent challenges to extract (Avµ)
n
v=−4
for µ ∈ [0..n] and (A′v)nv=−4. For each of these challenges c¯ it holds that rv =
∑n
µ=0Avµcµ
and r′v =
∑n
i=1 Avic
2
µ + A
′
v for v = [−4..n]. It could be that prover P ∗ can also generate
responses that are not of this form. Next lemma will show that this is computationally
difficult.
Lemma 4. Suppose there exists a knowledge extractor K that can extract (Av,µ)
n
v=−4 for
µ ∈ [0..n] and (A′v)nv=−4 in the expected polynomial-time such that equations the (7) and
(8) hold. Let (rv)
n
v=−4, (rv)
n
v=−4 be a response from the prover P
∗ that satisfies the equa-
tions (14) and (15). If the discrete logarithm assumption holds then with overwhelming
probability
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rv =
n∑
µ=0
Avµcµ
and
r′v =
n∑
i=1
Avic
2
i + A
′
v
for v ∈ [−4..n].
Proof. Suppose there exists an expected polynomial-time extractor K ′ such that it can
extract an accepting response where
rv 6=
n∑
µ=0
Avµcµ
or
r′v 6=
n∑
i=1
Avic
2
µ + A
′
v
for some v ∈ [−4..n]. Due to equation 14 and (7) we have
n∏
v=−4
f rvv =
n∏
µ=0
f
′c
µ =
n∏
µ=0
n∏
v=−4
fAvµcv =
n∏
v=−4
f
∑n
µ=0 Avµc
v .
Probability that K ′ can extract such a response in polynomial-time is negligible because
extended Pedersen commitment is computationally binding in a discrete logarithm group.
Analogous argument can be made about (r′v)
n
v=−4. Due to the equation (15), (7) and (8)
we have
n∏
v=−4
f r
′
v
v = f˜
′
0
n∏
i=1
f
′c2i
i =
n∏
v=−4
fA
′
v
v
n∏
i=1
n∏
v=−4
fAvµc
2
v =
n∏
v=−4
f
A′v+
∑n
i=1 Avµc
2
µ
v .
This also means thatK ′ would be able to generate two openings to the same commitment.
In the next two lemmas it will be shown that A is a permutation matrix. For these
lemmas we define polynomials
Rv :=
n∑
i=0
AviXi ∈ Zq[X1, X2, . . . Xn]
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for v ∈ {−4,−2, 1, 2, . . . , n} where X0 = 1 and
R′−3 :=
n∑
i=1
A−3iX2i + A
′
−3 ∈ Zq[X1, X2, . . . Xn].
Lemma 5. Let the elements (Av,µ)
n
v=−4 ∈ Zn+5q for µ ∈ [0..n], (A′v)nv=−4 ∈ Zn+5q and
ω ∈ Zq be such that for some (ci)ni=1 ∈ Znq values
rv =
n∑
µ=0
Avµcµ
for v ∈ {−2, 1, 2, . . . , n} and
r′−3 =
n∑
i=1
A−3ic2i + A
′
−3
satisfy equation (12). Then with overwhelming probability (Av,µ)
n
v=1 for µ ∈ [1..n] satisfies
the equation (1).
Proof. Let us look at the polynomial p =
∑n
j=1(R
3
j−X3j )−(R−2+R′−3+ω) ∈ Zq[X1, X2, . . . Xn].
Due to the equation (12) and the assumption of this lemma we have p(c1, . . . , cn) = 0.
According to the Schwartz-Zippel lemma with overwhelming probability p is a zero poly-
nomial.
Now let us express the polynomial p in a different form
p =
n∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=0
A3jiX
3
i + 3
∑
i 6=k
i,k∈[0..n]
A2jiX
2
i AjkXk+
+ 6
∑
0≤i<k<l≤n
AjiAjkAjlXiXkXl −X3j )− (R−2 +R′−3 + ω) =
=
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=1
A3jiX
3
i −
n∑
j=1
X3j + 3
n∑
j=1
∑
i 6=k
i,k∈[0..n]
A2jiX
2
i AjkXk+
+ 6
n∑
j=1
∑
0≤i<k<l≤n
AjiAjkAjlXiXkXl − (R−2 +R′−3 + ω). (*)
Let us look the first and the second addend separately
n∑
i=0
n∑
j=1
A3jiX
3
i −
n∑
j=1
X3j =
n∑
i=1
(
n∑
j=1
A3ji − δiii)X3i +
n∑
j=1
A3j0.
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The third addend in the equation (*) can be expressed as
3
n∑
j=1
∑
i 6=k
i,k∈[0..n]
A2jiX
2
i AjkXk = 3
∑
i 6=k
i,k∈[0..n]
n∑
j=1
A2jiAjkX
2
iXk =
= 3
∑
i 6=k
i,k∈[1..n]
(
n∑
j=1
A2jiAjk − δiik)X2iXk +
n∑
k=1
n∑
j=1
3A2j0AjkXk +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
3A2jiAj0X
2
i .
The fourth addend in (*) can be expressed as
6
n∑
j=1
∑
0≤i<k<l≤n
AjiAjkAjlXiXkXl = 6
∑
1≤i<k<l≤n
n∑
j=1
AjiAjkAjlXiXkXl+
+ 6
∑
1≤k<l≤n
n∑
j=1
Aj0AjkAjlXkXl =
= 6
∑
1≤i<k<l≤n
(
n∑
j=1
AjiAjkAjl − δikl)XiXkXl + 3
∑
1≤k<l≤n
n∑
j=1
Aj0AjkAjlXkXl+
3
∑
1≤l<k≤n
n∑
j=1
Aj0AjkAjlXkXl =
= 6
∑
1≤i<k<l≤n
(
n∑
j=1
AjiAjkAjl − δikl)XiXkXl +
∑
l 6=k
l,k∈[1..n]
n∑
j=1
3Aj0AjkAjlXkXl.
The final term in the equation (*) can be written as
−(R−2 +R′−3 + ω) = −
n∑
i=1
A−2iXi − A−20 −
n∑
i=1
A−3iX2i − A′−3 − ω
Putting all of the expression above together and by renaming some of the variables we
get
p =
n∑
i=1
(
n∑
h=1
A3hi − δiii)X3i + 3
∑
i 6=k
i,k∈[1..n]
(
n∑
h=1
A2hiAhk − δiik)X2iXk+
+ 6
∑
1≤i<k<l≤n
(
n∑
h=1
AhiAhkAhl − δikl)XiXkXl +
∑
l,k∈[1..n]
(
n∑
h=1
3Ah0AhkAhl − A−3kδlk)XkXl+
+
n∑
k=1
(
n∑
h=1
3A2h0Ahk − A−2k)Xk + (
n∑
h=1
A3h0 − A−20 − A′−3)− ω = 0.
25
Because this is a zero polynomial, coefficients of all the terms are zero. Therefore for any
i, k, l ∈ [1..n] we have
n∑
h=1
AhiAhkAhl = δikl.
Thus the equation (1) holds. In addition we have
ω =
n∑
h=1
A3h0 − A−20 − A′−3
A−2k =
n∑
h=1
3A2h0Ahk
for any k ∈ [1..n] and
A−3kδlk =
n∑
h=1
3Ah0AhkAhl
for any k, l ∈ [1..n]. In particular for l = k we have A−3k =
∑n
h=1 3Ah0A
2
hk. If A is a
permutation matrix then A−3k =
∑n
h=1 3Ah0Ahk.
Lemma 6. Let the elements (Av,µ)
n
v=−4 ∈ Zn+5q for µ ∈ [0..n] and ω˙ ∈ Zq be such that
for some (ci)
n
i=1 ∈ Znq values
rv =
n∑
µ=0
Avµcµ
for v ∈ {−4, 1, 2, . . . , n} can satisfy the equation (13). Then with overwhelming proba-
bility (Av,µ)
n
v=1 for µ ∈ [1..n] satisfies the equation (2).
Proof. Proof is analogous to the proof of the previous lemma. Let us look at the poly-
nomial
p =
n∑
h=1
(R2h −X2h)− (R−4 + ω˙) ∈ Zq[X1, X2, . . . , Xn].
As in the previous lemma, according to the Schwartz-Zippel lemma p = 0.
Polynomial p can be expressed as
p =
n∑
h=1
(R2h−X2h)−(R−4+ω˙) =
n∑
h=1
(
n∑
i=0
A2hiX
2
i +2
∑
0≤i<j≤n
AhiAhjXiXj−X2h)−(R−4+ω˙) =
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=
n∑
i=1
(
n∑
h=1
A2hi−δii)X2i +2
∑
1≤i<j≤n
n∑
h=1
AhiAhjXiXj+
n∑
j=1
n∑
h=1
2Ah0AhjXj+
n∑
h=1
A2h0−(R−4+ω˙) =
=
n∑
i=1
(
n∑
h=1
A2hi−δii)X2i +2
∑
1≤i<j≤n
(
n∑
h=1
AhiAhj−δij)XiXj+
n∑
j=1
(
n∑
h=1
2Ah0Ahj−A−4j)Xj+
+ (
n∑
h=1
A2h0 − A−40 − ω˙).
All the coefficient in this polynomial are zero, thus for any i, j ∈ [1..n] we have
n∑
h=1
AhiAhj = δi,j.
Therefore property 2 holds. In addition
ω˙ =
n∑
h=1
A2h0 − A−40
and
A−4j =
n∑
h=1
2Ah0Ahj
for j ∈ [1..n].
Lemma 7. Let ((gv,mv))
n
v=0 and (Av,µ)
n
v=−4 ∈ Zn+5q for µ ∈ [0..n] be some fixed values.
If for some (ci)
n
i=1 ∈ Znq values
rv =
n∑
µ=0
Avµcµ
for v ∈ [0..n] satisfy the equations (10) and (11) then with overwhelming probability
g′µ =
n∏
v=0
gAvµv (A)
m′µ =
n∏
v=0
mAvµv (B)
for µ ∈ [0..n].
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Proof. The equation (10) holds if and only if
1 =
∏n
v=0 g
rv
v∏n
µ=0(g
′
µ)
cµ
=
n∏
µ=0
(∏n
v=0 g
Avµ
v
g′µ
)cµ
.
Let us denote xµ := logg0
∏n
v=0 g
Avµ
v
g′µ
for µ ∈ [0..n]. Then
g0 =
n∏
µ=0
g
xµcµ
0 = g
∑n
µ=0 xµcµ
0 .
Thus
n∑
µ=0
xµcµ = 0.
According to the Schwartz-Zippel lemma with overwhelming probability x0 = x1 = . . . =
xn = 0 so the equation (12) holds. The equation (B) holds with similar argument for the
equation (11).
In the proof of the next theorem we will combine all the lemmas of this section to show
that the shue protocol has knowledge soundness.
Theorem 4. If the DL assumption holds then the shue protocol has knowledge sound-
ness.
Proof. Suppose there exists a prover P ∗ that can make the verifier V accept with prob-
ability ε(pk) > 0.
We construct a knowledge extractorK ′ that can extract in the expected timeO(poly(n)/ε(pk))
the permutation matrix and the randomizers that were used in shuing process.
The prover commits values g′0, m
′
0, f˜
′
0, (f
′
µ)
n
µ=0, ω and ω˙. We set a rewinding point for
P ∗ after the commitment.
According to the lemma 3 there exists an extractor algorithm K that can in an expected
number of steps O(poly(n)
ε(pk)
) extract (Av,µ)
n
v=−4 ∈ Zn+5q for µ ∈ [0..n] and (A′v)nv=−4 that
satisfy the equations (7) and (8). We apply extractor K to the prover P ∗.
In the 1/ε(pk) expected number of steps we can extract an accepting response (rv)
n
v=−4, (r
′
v)
n
v=−4
for a uniformly random challenge (ci)
n
i=1 ←r Znq . According to the lemma 2 the reponse
satisfies equations (14) and (15). If the discrete logarithm assumption holds then accord-
ing to the lemma 4 with overwhelming probability
rv =
n∑
µ=0
Avµcµ
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r′v =
n∑
i=1
Avic
2
i + A
′
v
for v ∈ [−4..n].
According to the lemma 5 and 6 with overwhelming probability A := (Avµ) for v, µ ∈ [1..n]
satisfies the equations (1) and (2). Due to the theorem 1 the matrix A is a permutation
matrix.
According to the lemma 7 the matrix A and the vector(A0µ)
n
µ=0 satisfy the equation (3).
Thus extractor K ′ has extracted a permutation matrix A and randomizers (A0µ)nµ=0 used
for shuing.
Theorem 5. The shue protocol is special honest-verifier zero-knowledge.
Proof. Let (ci)
n
i=1 ∈ Znq be an arbitrary challenge. We first show that using this challenge
it is possible to create an accepting view in polynomial-time.
We pick uniformly randomly (rv)
n
v=−4, (r
′
v)
n
v=−4 ←r Zn+5q and (f ′i)ni=1 ←r Gn. We generate
values f˜ ′0, f
′
0, g
′
0,m
′
0, ω and ω˙ such that the verification equations hold. We take
g′0 =
∏n
v=0 g
rv
v∏n
µ=1(g
′
µ)
cµ m
′
0 =
∏n
v=0m
rv
v∏n
µ=1(m
′
µ)
cµ
ω =
∑n
j=1(r
3
j − c3j)− r−2 − r′−3 ω˙ =
∑n
j=1(r
2
j − c2j)− r−4.
and as a result the equations (10), (11), (12) and (13) hold. We pick f˜ ′0 and f
′
0 such that
the equations (14) and (15) hold i.e.
f ′0 =
∏n
v=−4 f
rv
v∏n
µ=1(f
′
µ)
cµ f˜0
′
=
∏n
v=−4 f
r′v
v∏n
µ=1(f
′
µ)
c2µ
.
As it is shown in the proof of the lemma 2, the equation (9) holds if and only if
∏n
v=−4 f
rv
v∏n
µ=0(f
′
µ)
cµ
=
(
f˜0
′∏n
i=1(f
′
i)
c2i∏n
v=−4 f
r′v
v
)α
.
Previous equation holds thus also equation (9) holds. We have generated an accepting
view for challenge (ci)
n
i=1.
Secondly we show that for uniformly random challenge (ci)
n
i=1, simulated conversation
has exactly the same distribution as the conversation between honest prover and honest
verifier.
Values (rv)
n
v=−4 and (r
′
v)
n
i=−4 are in the real protocol uniformly random and independent
elements in Zq because they are hidden respectively by (Av0)nv=−4 and (A′v)nv=−4. Values
(f ′µ)
n
µ=1 are uniformly random and independent elements in G in the real conversation
because (A−1i)ni=1 hides them.
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Values g′0, m
′
0, f˜
′
0, f
′
0, ω and ω˙ depend on (rv)
n
v=−4, (r
′
v)
n
i=−4 and (f
′
µ)
n
µ=1 the same way
in the real conversation and the simulated conversation. Thus they are identically dis-
tributed.
3.3 Ideas for Improvement
One of the goals of this thesis is to see whether the Furukawa shue argument can be
improved. We suggest two simple variations on the shue protocol and then propose two
new approaches how to characterize a permutation matrix.
Let us analyse the complexity of the current protocol. In the equation (7) prover does no
exponentiations for f
A1µ
1 , . . . , f
Anµ
n as the exponent is 0 or 1 and one exponentiation for
each of f
A−4µ
−4 , f
A−3µ
−3 , f
A−2µ
−2 , f
A−1µ
−1 and f
A0µ
0 for µ ∈ [0..n]. That constitutes for roughly
5n exponentiation. First three of them are needed to cancel out redundant terms in
the equations (12) and (13). Using different characterization of a permutation matrix
or different verification equations could reduce the exponentiations. Computing values
g0, m0, f˜0 takes roughly 3n exponentiations. Value f˜0 is needed to verify that (r
′
v)
n
v=−4
is correctly computed. Values (r′v)
n
v=−4 are sent because the equation (12) needs r
′
−3 to
cancel out one quadratic term. Again it would beneficial if the verification equations
would not have as many terms that need to be canceled.
Altogether the prover has to do 8n exponentiations. The verifier does 2n exponentiations
in each of the equations (9), (10) and (11). In commitment phase the prover has to send
roughly n elements of G. In challenge and response phase 3n elements of Zq are sent.
The communication complexity will be n log p+ 3n log q bits.
New Characterizations
Let us notice the following fact. Let A = (Ai,j) ∈ Zn×nq . If we interpret the property∑n
h=1 AhiAhj = δi,j for i, j ∈ [1..n] as a matrix product then we have ATA = I. From
linear algebra we know that if a square matrix is left invertible then it is also right
invertible and those inverses are the same. Then we will ATA = AAT = I. This is a
well-known class of orthogonal matrices.
This fact was also noticed in [GL07]. In [GL07] they modify Furukawa shue argument
using the following theorem.
Theorem 6. Let A = (Ai,j) be an n× n integer matrix. If ATA = I and for i ∈ [1..n]
n∑
h=1
Ahi = 1
then A is a permutation matrix.
Proof. Because ATA = I we have
30
n∑
h=1
A2hi = 1
for i ∈ [1..n]. This is only possible if the i-th column has exactly one nonzero element
that is either 1 or -1. Property
∑n
h=1Ahi = 1 guarantees that the nonzero element is 1.
There cannot be any zero rows because the matrix A is regular. Then A is a permutation
matrix.
Problem with this property is that we need to use integer commitment schemes which
are much less efficient. Over the field Zq this characterization does not hold.
Next we will present two new characterizations.
Theorem 7. Let q be a prime. Matrix A ∈ Zn×nq is a permutation matrix if and only if
for any i, j, k ∈ [1..n]
n∑
h=1
Ah,iAh,jAh,k = δi,j,k
and
n∑
h=1
Ah,i = 1.
Proof. According to the lemma 1 each row and column of the matrix A has exactly one
nonzero element. The second property gives that the nonzero elements are equal to 1.
Thus A is a permutation matrix.
Both in [Fur05] and [GL07] it seems to have gone unnoticed that the equation (1) in the
theorem 1 can be made weaker.
Theorem 8. Let n ≤ q and A ∈ Zn×nq . Then A is a permutation matrix if and only if A
is orthogonal and for any i, j ∈ [1..n]
n∑
h=1
Ah,iA
2
h,j = δi,j. (*)
Proof. ⇒) Follows from theorem 1.
⇐) If we look the equation (*) as a matrix multiplication then AT (A◦A) = I. Multiplying
by A from left gives
A ◦ A = A.
Then
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A2i,j = Ai,j ⇒ Ai,j(Ai,j − 1) = 0
and thus Ai,j ∈ {0, 1} for any i, j ∈ [1..n]. Considering that the matrix A is both
orthogonal and boolean matrix we have
1 =
n∑
h=1
A2hi =
n∑
h=1
Ahi
for i ∈ [1..n]. As n ≤ q we have that ∑nh=1 Ahi cannot wrap around and so the i-th
column has one 1 and all the other elements are 0. The matrix A is regular therefore
there cannot be any zero rows. Then A is a permutation matrix.
It is not clear if this weaker property allows to construct a more efficient shue protocol.
Variation 1
According to the theorem 2, matrix A ∈ Zn×nq is a permutation if the equation (1) holds
and q ≡ 2 (mod 3). In [Fur05] this property is used for the shue-decryption protocol
but not for the shue protocol. The article does not explain why this is not used for the
shue protocol.
If we take q ≡ 2 (mod 3) then we do not need the equation (13). Then r−4 is not needed,
it means that in all of the equations where we previously had indices v ∈ [−4..n] we now
have v ∈ [−3..n]. In the equation (7) we do not need to compute fA−4µ−4 for µ ∈ [0..n]. Then
prover's computation is 7n exponentiations instead of 8n exponentiations. Soundness and
SHVZK proofs are almost indentical.
Variation 2
If we do not add the extra restriction on q, it is still possible to reduce the prover's
computation by n exponentiations.
We remove the values related to r−4 as in variation 1. We change how random values
Av0 used for hiding rv, are picked. For v ∈ [−3..n− 1] we pick Av0 ←r Zq as before but
An0 = −
∑n−1
h=1 Ah0.
We add the verification equation
∑n
h=1 rh − ch = 0. Let us see that modified protocol is
sound.
n∑
h=1
rh − ch =
n∑
h=1
n∑
µ=0
Ahµcµ −
n∑
h=1
ch =
n∑
h=1
Ah0 +
n∑
µ=1
n∑
h=1
Ahµcµ −
n∑
h=1
ch =
=
n∑
µ=1
(
n∑
h=1
Ahµ − 1)cµ
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According to the Schwartz-Zippel lemma
∑n
h=1Ahµ = 1 with overwhelming probability
for µ ∈ [1..n].
Using the theorem 7 gives that A is a permutation matrix. Rest of the soundness proof
is the same as before.
The modified protocol is SHVZK. Difference with simulation in the theorem 5 is the
generation of rv. Simulator picks randomly rv ←r Zq for v ∈ [−3..n− 1]. The value rn is
generated as
rn =
n∑
h=1
ch −
n−1∑
h=1
rh.
It is clear that the new verification equation holds. Also (rv)
n
v=1 has the same distribution
as for the honest P and V .
4 Furukawa Shue-Decryption Argument
In practice mix-network should work as follows, users send messages that are encrypted
with mix-networks public key of the first mixer. Output from the last mixer should be
decrypted ciphertexts in randomized order.
Giving private key to one particular mixer imposes a vulnerability. Instead private key
should be secret shared between the mixers and each mixer does partial decryption with
it's share.
In order to prove the correctness of shuing, each mixer should also prove correctness of
decryption. Shuing and decryption proofs can be done separately. It might however be
more efficient to prove them together.
We present shue-decryption protocol from [Fur05]. It combines argument of shuing in
previous section and decryption argument that will be presented in the next subsection.
Some of the computation in those arguments overlaps and so the combined protocol is
more efficient then performing two arguments separately.
This protocol is not HVZK because it is impossible to simulate shued state of cipher-
texts. It can be shown that shue-decryption satisfies weaker privacy requirement which
is called complete permutation hiding (CPH). Weaker security definition allows us to
reduce computation complexity by removing some of the random values.
4.1 Decryption Protocol
We describe the decryption argument that we later combine with the shue argument.
Decryption argument is based on the Schnorr's protocol [Sch91].
Let p and q be large primes such that q|p − 1. Let G be an order q subgroup of a
multiplicative group Z∗q and g0 is a generator of G. Let x be an ElGamal private key
and y = gx0 the corresponding public key. We have ElGamal ciphertexts (g
′
i, m¯i)
n
i=1 and
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(g′i,m
′
i)
n
i=1. Prover must convince verifier that (g
′
i,m
′
i) is decryption of (g
′
i, m¯i) without
revealing anything about the private key x.
We define X := (p, q, g0, y, (g
′
i, m¯i)
n
i=1, (g
′
i,m
′
i)
n
i=1) where the sequence X is a common
input to the prover and the verifier. The prover knows in addition the private key x.
Theorem 9. Decryption protocol is complete, sound and HVZK.
Proof. It is easy to verify by substituting the correct values to the verification equation
that this protocol is complete.
Next we will show that the presented protocol is sound. The extractor sends (ci)
n
i=1 to
the prover. The prover responds with sending y′, η′ to the extractor. The extractor sets
a rewinding point and rewinds the prover until it gets two accepting responses r′1 and r
′
2
such that corresponding challenges c′1 and c
′
2 are not equal. This can be done in expected
polynomial-time if the prover is successful with non-negligible probability.
Then we have
g
r′1
0 = y
c′1y′
g
r′2
0 = y
c′2y′.
Dividing one the mentioned equations by the other gives
g
r′1−r′2
0 = y
c′1−c′2 ⇒ y = g
r′1−r′2
c′1−c′2
0 .
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Thus we have extracted x =
r′1−r′2
c′1−c′2 .
Similarly from the equations ζr
′
1 = ηc
′
1η′ and ζr
′
2 = ηc
′
2η′ we can get
η = ζ
r′1−r′2
c′1−c′2 = ζx.
Therefore
n∏
i=1
(
m′i
m¯i
)ci
=
n∏
i=1
(g′xi )
ci
n∏
i=1
(
m′i/m¯i
g′xi
)ci
= 1.
Using Schwartz-Zippel similarly to lemma 7, we get
g′xi =
m′i
m¯i
for i ∈ [1..n]. It follows that the protocol is sound.
Finally we show that the protocol is HVZK.We pick uniformly randomly c1, c2, . . . , cn, c
′, r′ ←r
Zq. The values y′ and η′ are picked such that the verification equations would hold i.e.
y′ = g
r′
0
yc′ η
′ = ζ
r′
ηc′ .
As they depend on the values r′ and c′ the same way as in the real conversation between
the prover and the verifier, we get that the simulated messages have the same distribution
as in the honest conversation.
4.2 Description
Let p and q be primes such that q|p−1 and q ≡ 2 (mod 3). Let G be an order q subgroup
of Z∗p, g0 be a generator of G and m0 ∈ G be an ElGamal public key. Element y = gx0 ∈ G
is mixer's personal public key and x ∈ Zq is the corresponding private key.
Let (gi,mi)
n
i=1 and (g
′
i,m
′
i)
n
i=1 be the ElGamal ciphertexts. The mixer picks randomly
(A0,i)
n
i=1 ←r Znq and a permutation matrix A = (Ai,j) ∈ Zn×nq . The mixer must prove
that the ciphertexts were both shued and partially decrypted with the private key x
i.e.
(g′i,m
′
i) = (g
A0,i
0
n∏
j=1
g
Aji
j , g
′−x
i
n∏
j=1
m
Aji
j )
for i ∈ [1..n].
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Because the shue-decryption protocol satisfies a weaker definition of privacy, we may
omit f−1 from the shue protocol. Using q ≡ 2 (mod 3) allows us to omit f−4 as well
because the equation (13) is not needed anymore. Renaming elements fi gives that we
need Fn := (fi)
n
i=−2 ←r (G \ {1})n+3 for the extended Pedersen commitment.
We denoteXκ = (p, q, y, g0,m0, Fn, (gi,mi)
n
i=1, (g
′
i,m
′
i)
n
i=1) andWκ = (x, (Ai,j)i,j∈[1..n], (A0i)
n
i=1).
Here κ is a security parameter. Length of the primes p and q is polynomial in κ. Xκ is
the common input to the prover and the verifier and Wκ is the witness for the prover.
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4.3 Soundness
Theorem 10. The shue-decryption protocol is complete.
Proof. Similar to checking completeness of the shue protocol and the decryption pro-
tocol.
Soundness proof is also very similar to the soundness proof of the shue protocol.
Lemma 8. If the equation (16) holds then the probability that
n∏
v=−2
f rvv =
n∏
µ=0
(f ′µ)
cµ (14)
and
n∏
v=−2
f r
′
v
v = f˜
′
0
n∏
µ=1
(f ′µ)
c2µ (15)
hold is 1− 1
q
.
Proof. Similar to the proof of lemma 2.
Lemma 9. If P ∗ can make V accept the protocol with probability ε(κ) > 0 then there
exists an extractor K that can extract from P ∗ the values (Av,µ)nv=−2 for µ ∈ [0..n] and
(A′v)
n
v=−2 in expected time O(
poly(n)
ε(κ)
). The extracted values satisfy equations
f ′µ =
n∏
v=−2
fAvµv (22)
f˜ ′0 =
n∏
v=−2
fA
′
v
v (23)
for µ ∈ [0..n].
Proof. Similar to the proof of lemma 3.
Lemma 10. Suppose there exists a knowledge extractor K that can extract (Av,µ)
n
v=−2
for µ ∈ [0..n] and (A′v)nv=−2 in expected polynomial-time such that the equations (22) and
(23) hold. Let (rv)
n
v=−2, (rv)
n
v=−2 be a response from the prover P
∗ that satisfies the equa-
tions (14) and (15). If the discrete logarithm assumption holds then with overwhelming
probability we have
rv =
n∑
µ=0
Avµcµ
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and
r′v =
n∑
i=1
Avic
2
i + A
′
v
for v ∈ [−2..n].
Proof. Similar to the proof of lemma 4.
Lemma 11. Let the elements (Av,µ)
n
v=−2 ∈ Zn+3q for µ ∈ [0..n], (A′v)nv=−2 ∈ Zn+3q and
ω ∈ Zq be such that for some (ci)ni=1 ∈ Znq values
rv =
n∑
µ=0
Avµcµ
for v ∈ {−2, 1, 2, . . . , n} and
r′−2 =
n∑
i=1
A−2ic2i + A
′
−2
satisfy the equation (19). Then with overwhelming probability (Av,µ)
n
v=1 for µ ∈ [1..n]
satisfies the equation
∑n
h=1AhiAhjAhk = δi,j,k for any i, j, k ∈ [1..n].
Proof. Similar to the proof of lemma 5.
Lemma 12. Let ((gv,mv))
n
v=0 and (Av,µ)
n
v=−2 ∈ Zn+3q for µ ∈ [0..n] be some fixed values.
If for some (ci)
n
i=1 ∈ Znq values
rv =
n∑
µ=0
Avµcµ
for v ∈ [0..n] satisfy the equation (17) then with overwhelming probability
g′µ =
n∏
v=0
gAvµv
for µ ∈ [0..n].
Proof. Similar to the proof of lemma 7.
Lemma 13. Suppose the prover P ∗ can make the verifier V accept with non-negligible
probability. Then there exists an extractor K¯ that can extract in expected polynomial-
time x′ such that y = gx
′
0 .
Proof. Similar to the extractor in the theorem 9.
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Lemma 14. Let y = gx
′
0 . If the equations (20) and (21) hold then with overwhelming
probability
η = ζx
′
.
Proof. If (20) holds then
gr
′
0 = y
c′y′ = gx
′c′
0 y
′ ⇒ y′ = gr′−x′c′0 =: gβ0 .
Then r′ = x′c′ + β where β is some constant independent of c′.
Because the equation (21) holds we have
ηc
′
η′ = ζr
′
= ζc
′x′+β.
This can be expressed as
(
η
ζx′
)c′
· η
′
ζβ
= 1.
Using the Schwartz-Zippel similarly as in the lemma 3 gives that with overwhelming
probability η = ζx
′
.
Lemma 15. Assume (gv,mv)
n
v=0, (g
′
v)
n
v=1, (Avµ)v,µ∈[0..n] and x
′ are given. For a given
(ci)
n
i=1 values
rv =
n∑
µ=0
Avµcµ
η = (
n∏
j=1
(g′j)
cj)x
′
for v ∈ [0..n] are generated. If the equation (18) holds then with overwhelming probability
m′i = g
′−x′
i
n∏
v=0
mAviv
for i ∈ [0..n].
Proof. The equation (18) holds, thus
n∏
v=0
mrvv = η
n∏
µ=0
(m′µ)
cµ = m′0
n∏
µ=1
(g′x
′
µ m
′
µ)
cµ .
Considering that rv =
∑n
µ=0Avµcµ, we get
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n∏
v=0
mrvv =
n∏
v=0
m
∑n
µ=0 Avµcµ
v =
n∏
µ=0
(
n∏
v=0
mAvµv )
cµ .
Dividing the two previous equations gives
m′0∏n
v=0 m
Av0
v
·
n∏
µ=1
(
g′x
′
µ m
′
µ∏n
v=0 m
Avµ
v
)cµ
= 1.
Using the Schwartz-Zippel lemma similarly as in the lemma 7 gives us that with over-
whelming probability for µ ∈ [1..n]
g′x
′
µ m
′
µ =
n∏
v=0
mAvµv .
Then also
m′µ = g
′−x′
µ
n∏
v=0
mAvµv .
Theorem 11. If the DL assumption holds then the shue-decryption protocol has
knowledge soundness.
Proof. Suppose there exist a prover P ∗ that can make a verifier V accept with probability
p > 0.
According to the lemma 9 there exist an extractor K that can extract (Avµ)
n
v=−2 for
µ ∈ [1..n] and (A′v)nv=−2 in expected polynomial-time such that the equations (22) and
(23) hold.
According to the lemma 10 if the discrete logarithm assumption holds then response from
the P ∗ is with overwhelming probability
rv =
n∑
µ=0
Avµcµ
r′v =
n∑
i=1
Avic
2
i + A
′
v.
According to the lemma 11 and the theorem 2 A = (Ai,j)i,j∈[1..n] is a permutation matrix.
According to the lemma 12 (gi)
n
i=1 were shued with the permutation matrix A.
Lemma 13 allows to extract the private key x′ efficiently. Lemma 14 says that with
overwhelming probability η is computed correctly. Then according to the lemma 15
(mi)
n
i=1 is shued correctly.
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4.4 Privacy
It is impossible to simulate η without knowing x′. Thus we cannot prove that the shue-
decryption protocol is HVZK. In [Fur05] they define a weaker security definition called
complete permutation hiding (CPH) and show that the shue-decryption protocol has
that property.
We consider the privacy of a mixer in a scenario where potentially all the users and all
the other mixers collaborate.
Let Iκ := (1
κ, p, q, x¯, (Mi)
n
i=1) where x¯ is the sum of all the other mixer's private keys and
Mi are the messages that users wish to send. Let U be a probabilistic polynomial-time
Turing machine that produces ((gi,mi))
n
i=1. We assume that it is possible to extract
randomness r¯i from U such that gi = g
r¯i
0 . By enc(U) we denote the encoding of the
Turing machine U . We define an algorithm Gen for generating statement-witness pair
(Xκ,Wκ).
Algorithm 1: Gen(Iκ, enc(U))
input : Iκ, enc(U)
output: Xκ,Wκ
g0 ←r G;
x′ ←r Zq;
(si)
n
i=1 ←r Znq ;
picks uniformly randomly a permutation pi;
((gi,mi))
n
i=1 = U(In, g0, y);
((g′i,m
′
i))
n
i=1 = ((g
si
0 gpi−1(i), g
′−x′
i m
si
0 mpi−1(i)))
n
i=1;
Fn := (fi)
n
i=−2 ←r (G \ {1})n+3;
Xκ = (p, q, y, g0,m0, Fn, ((gi,mi))
n
i=1, ((g
′
i,m
′
i))
n
i=1);
Wκ = (pi, (si)
n
i=1, x
′);
By V iewPV we denote everything that verifier sees in the interaction: Xκ, messages V
sends and receives from P and the random tape of V .
Definition 15. We say that a shue-decryption argument (P, V,Gen) has complete
permutation hiding if
∃E ′E ∀E ∀H ∀f ∀U ∀c > 0 ∃N ∀n > N ∀Iκ :
Pr[E(V iewPV , H(Iκ, enc(U), Xκ, pi)) = f(pi)]
< Pr[E ′(Xκ, H(Iκ, enc(U), Xκ, pi)) = f(pi)] +
1
nc
and
∃K ∀U ∀Iκ V iewPV ∼p K(Iκ, g0, y, enc(U), pi)
where E ′, E, f, U and K are probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines and pi is a
permutation. For both predicates Gen(Iκ, enc(U)) is used to generate Xκ and Wκ.
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The Turing machine E denotes an adversary. The Turing machine H denotes external
information from other mixers and users and the partial information about pi. The
Turing machine f denotes information that the adversary E is trying to learn about the
permutation pi. The Turing machine K allows H to produce other interactions between
P and V . These correspond to the previous interactions that an adversary might have
seen. Definition says that given the same external information, there is a probabilistic
Turing machine E ′ that can learn with overwhelming probability as much about pi as
any adversary E that sees the interaction between P and V . Thus with overwhelming
probability the interaction does not reveal anything about the permutation.
We define a simulator S.
Algorithm 2: S(Xκ)
input : Xκ
output: (f ′i)
n
i=1, f˜
′
0, g
′
0,m
′
0, ω, (ci)
n
i=1, (rv)
n
v=−2, (r
′
v)
n
v=−2, η, η
′, y′, c′, r′
(ci)
n
i=1 ←r Znq ;
(rv)
n
v=−2, (r
′
v)
n
v=−2 ←r Zn+3q ;
r′, c′ ←r Zq;
(f ′i)
n
i=1 ←r Gn;
η ←r G;
f ′0 =
∏n
v=−2 f
rv
v
∏n
i=1 f
′−ci
i ;
f˜ ′0 =
∏n
v=−2 f
r′v
v
∏n
i=1 f
′−c2i
i ;
g′0 =
∏n
v=0 g
rv
v
∏n
i=1 g
′−ci
i ;
m′0 = η
−1∏n
v=0m
rv
v
∏n
i=1 m
′−ci
i ;
ω =
∑n
j=1(r
3
j − c3j)− r−2 − r′−1;
y′ = gr
′
0 y
−c′ ;
η′ = ζr
′
η−c
′
Proof strategy is as follows. We show that if the shue-decryption is not CPH then the
simulation can be distinguished from the real view. Then we show that distinguishing is
equivalent to breaking DDH assumption. So the shue-decryption is CPH.
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We define an algorithm M that generates a view from Θ3n ∈ R3n.
Algorithm 3: M(Iκ, enc(U),Θ3n)
input : Iκ, enc(U),Θ3n
output: Xκ, (f
′
i)
n
i=0, f˜0
′
, g′0,m
′
0, ω, (ci)
n
i=1, (rv)
n
v=−2, (r
′
v)
n
v=−2, η, η
′, y′, c′, r′, A
f−2, f−1, f1, . . . , fn ←r G \ {1};
f0 = θ3,0;
g0 = θ1,0;
Fn = (fi)
n
i=−2;
((gi,mi))
n
i=1 = U(In, g0, y, Fn);
extract r¯i from U such that gi = g
r¯i
0 for i ∈ [1..n];
(ci)
n
i=1 ←r Znq ;
(rv)
n
v=−2, (r
′
v)
n
v=−2 ←r Zn+3q ;
r′, c′ ←r Zq;
picks a random permutation matrix A = (Ai,j)i,j∈[1..n];
m0 = yg
x¯
0 ;
(g′i)
n
i=1 = (θ1,i
∏n
j=1 g
Aji
j )
n
i=1;
(m′i)
n
i=1 = (y
−∑nj=1 r¯jAjiθx¯1,i∏nj=1mAjij )ni=1;
(Ai,0)
n
i=1 = (ri −
∑n
j=1 Ai,jcj)
n
i=1;
(A−1,i)ni=1 = (
∑n
j=1 3Aj,0Aj,i)
n
i=1;
(A−2,i)ni=1 = (
∑n
j=1 3A
2
j,0Aj,i)
n
i=1;
ζ =
∏n
i=1 g
′ci
i ;
η = y
∑
i,j∈[1..n] r¯jAj,ici
∏n
i=1 θ
ci
2,i;
η′ = ζr
′
η−c
′
;
g′0 = ζ
−1∏n
v=0 g
rv
v ;
m′0 = η
−1∏n
v=0 m
rv
v
∏n
i=1m
′−ci
i ;
y′ = gr
′
0 y
−c′ ;
(f ′i)
n
i=1 = (f
A−2i
−2 f
A−1i
−1 θ3,i
∏n
j=1 f
Aj,i
j )
n
i=1;
f ′0 =
∏n
v=−2 f
rv
v
∏n
i=1 f
′−ci
i ;
f˜ ′0 =
∏n
v=−2 f
r′v
v
∏n
i=1 f
′−c2i
i ;
ω =
∑n
j=1(r
3
j − c3j)− r−2 − r′−1;
Xκ = (p, q, y, g0,m0, Fn, ((gi,mi))
n
i=1, ((g
′
i,m
′
i))
n
i=1);
Lemma 16. Let Xκ,Wκ = Gen(Iκ, enc(U)). Let V iew
P
V be the distribution of the veri-
fier's view respect toXκ,Wκ and enc(U). If Θ3n ←r D3n then V iewPV ∼p M(Iκ, enc(U),Θ3n).
Proof. It is clear that the only difference in the distributions comes from the values in
Θ3n.
For i ∈ [1..n] we have
logθ2,0 θ2,i =
logθ1,0 θ2,i
logθ1,0 θ2,0
=
logθ1,0 θ2,i
logθ1,i θ2,i
=
logθ1,0 θ2,i logθ1,0 θ1,i
logθ1,0 θ2,i
= logθ1,0 θ1,i.
Similarly we can show that logθ3,0 θ3,i = logθ1,0 θ1,i.
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Then logθ1,0 θ1,i = logθ2,0 θ2,i = logθ3,0 θ3,i. We have that θ1,0, θ2,0, θ3,0 correspond respec-
tively to g0, y, f0 and θ1,i, θ2,i, θ3,i correspond respectively to g
A0i
0 , y
A0i , fA0i0 .
Elements of Θ3n are distributed the same way as the corresponding elements in the real
protocol because we saw that for each i ∈ [1..n] elements θ1,i, θ2,i and θ3,i have the same
exponent.
Lemma 17. Let Xκ,Wκ = Gen(Iκ, enc(U)) and V iew
∗ = S(Xκ). If Θ3n ←r R3n then
V iew∗ ∼p M(Iκ, enc(U),Θ3n).
Proof. If Θ3n ←r R3n then the elements of Θ3n are uniformly random in G. From the
definition of the algorithm M it is clear that then f ′i and η are uniformly random and
independent elements from G exactly as the simulator S generates. All the other elements
are generated the same way by S and M . It follows that the distributions are the
same.
Lemma 18. There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine K such that
K(Iκ, g0, y, enc(U), pi) ∼p V iewPV .
Proof. We assumed that it is possible to efficiently extract from U values r¯i such that
gi = g
r¯i
0 . Then it is possible to express g
′x′
i as follows
g′x
′
i = (g
A0,i
0
n∏
j=1
g
Aji
j )
x′ = (g
A0,i
0
n∏
j=1
g
r¯jAji
0 )
x′ = yA0,i+
∑n
j=1 r¯jAj,i .
This allows to simulate m′i and η without the knowledge of x
′
m′i = g
′−x′
i
n∏
v=0
mAviv = y
−A0,i−
∑n
j=1 r¯jAj,i
n∏
v=0
mAviv
η =
n∏
i=1
(g′x
′
i )
ci =
n∏
i=1
(yA0,i+
∑n
j=1 r¯jAj,i)ci .
Rest of the values can be simulated as before.
Theorem 12. If the DDH assumption holds then the shue-decryption protocol is
CPH.
Proof. Suppose the contrary. Then according to the definition of CPH
∀E ′E ∃E ∃H ∃f ∃U ∃c > 0 ∀N ∃n > N ∃Iκ :
Pr[E(V iewPV , H(Iκ, enc(U), Xκ, pi)) = f(pi)]
≥ Pr[E ′(Xκ, H(Iκ, enc(U), Xκ, pi)) = f(pi)] + 1
nc
.
45
Let us pick E ′E such that it first generates V iewP∗V using simulator S and then gives it
as an input to the algorithm E. Then
∃H ∃f ∃U ∃c > 0 ∀N ∃n > N ∃Iκ :
Pr[E(V iewPV , H(Iκ, enc(U), Xκ, pi)) = f(pi)]
≥ Pr[E(V iewP∗V , H(Iκ, enc(U), Xκ, pi)) = f(pi)] +
1
nc
.
This allows us to break the DDH3n assumption. Given Θ3n we run the algorithm M on
some Iκ and enc(U). Machine M returns among other values Xκ and a permutation
matrix A. Let pi be the permutation corresponding to A.
From the lemmas 16 and 17 we know that if Θ3n ←r D3n then V iewPV ∼p M(Iκ, enc(U),Θ3n)
and if Θ3n ←r R3n then V iewP∗V ∼p M(Iκ, enc(U),Θ3n).
If E(V iewP∗V , H(Iκ, enc(U), Xκ, pi)) = f(pi) then with non-negligible probability Θ3n ∈
D3n. Therefore we can distinguish between the cases Θ3n ∈ D3n and Θ3n ∈ R3n with
non-negligible probability.
The lemma 18 shows that it is possible to construct the simulator needed in the CPH
definition.
5 Conclusion
In this thesis, we gave a detailed description of the shue and the shue-decryption
arguments from [Fur05].
We also showed two simple variations on the original shue protocol that allow to reduce
the computation by n exponentiations. First variation is a very simple modification based
on constraining the group size q. This idea is alluded in the original paper but for some
reason they present a less efficient protocol that needs to check if A is orthogonal.
Second variation does not constrain q but uses another property to guarantee that A is a
permutation matrix. Still, we see that computation is reduced by n exponentiation. Con-
clusion from these two variations is that if we use the property
∑n
h=1AhiAhjAhk = δi,j,k,
then there is no reason to verify if A is orthogonal. There are more efficient alternatives
for verifying orthogonality which also guarantee that A is a permutation matrix.
We also showed that if A is orthogonal, then it is sufficient to check
∑n
h=1 A
2
hiAhj = δi,j,
instead of
∑n
h=1AhiAhjAhk = δi,j,k to get thatA is a permutation matrix. Further research
is needed to see, if this characterization can be used to get a more efficient protocol.
In the Furukawa shue protocol, half of the exponentiations on the prover's side come
from the necessity of cancelling redundant terms in two of the equations. Having a better
characterization of a permutation matrix or better verification equations for proving that
A is a permutation matrix seem to have potential in reducing some of that computation.
This seems to be the most promising direction for further improvement.
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